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ADnmINISTRATORS-COMPLETING CONTRAC.-IN RE ALLAm'S ESTATE, 49 Atl.
252 (Penn.).-Where an administrator in his discretion completed some unfin-
ished building contracts of the decedent, thereby creating new debts. Held,
that the debts contracted by the decedent in his life-time took precedence over
the debts contracted by the administrator.
Morrow v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch. 549, which seems to be the only case in
this country with a practically similar state of facts, decided that, even where
the decedent had authorized the carrying on of his business, the debts cn-
tracted by him in his life-time were entitled to priority of payment over such
debts as were contracted by his administrator. The present decision is in
conformity with the English case of Labouchere v. Tupper, ii Moore P. C.
221.
BASTARDY-EVIDENCE-CORROBORATION OF PROSECUTING WITNESS.-STATE
V. MEARES, 39 S. E. Rep. 245 (S. C.).-The judge refused to charge that
the testimony of the mother should be corroborated in some material particular
before a verdict of guilty could be rendered. Held, that it was not error.
It is the law in England that a mother's testimony must be corroborated
in some material particular before a man can be adjudged the putative father.
But this is a statutory rule, and in the absence of such a statute, no corrobora-
tion is required. 29 Am. v. Eng. Emc. Law, 834. The court rules that even
if the mother could be regarded as an accomplice, it would still be unnecessary
to corroborate her testimony, and quotes State v. Prater, 26 S. C. 207, 2 S. E.
112. "It is true that the proper practice is for the presiding judge to advise
the jury not to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
but we know of no authority which requires that they shall be directed to
acquit unless the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRoCESs-ABSENCE OF ALLEGED LUNATIC FROM
HEARiNG.-JETTA SIMON V. JOHN V. CRAF-, 21 Sup. Ct. 836.-In pursuance
of a writ issued under the Alabama Civil Code, 1886, Section 2393, the plain-
tiff in error was taken into custody and remanded to await the decision of a
jury as to her sanity. The statute provided that the sheriff serving the writ
was to determine whether it would be consistent with the health and safety
of any person so taken to have him or her present, at the place of the trial.
In this particular case the sheriff decided the question against the plaintiff in
error, and she was not allowed at the hearing, wherein she was found to be
of unsound mind. Held, that such a proceeding was not in violation of the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In all cases where the principle of "due process of law" is concerned, the
main consideration is whether the condemned person has had sufficient notice
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and adequate opportunity to defend himself. Louisville v. Nashville R. R. Co.
v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230; Iowa Central R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 16o U. S., 389,
As early as i87o the Supreme Court of Alabama in Fore v. Fore,44 Ala., 418,
held that the mere serving of the writ upon a supposed lunatic brought the
defendant into court. The plaintiff in error was thus technically before the
court, and she suffered the loss of no constitutional right if she did not,
either through counsel or her guardian "ad, litem," enter at that time her
matters of defence.
CRIMINAL LAw-LBEL-TRuTH AS JUsTIFIcATIoN.-STATE V. BROCH, 39
S. E. Rep. 359 (S. C.).-The constitution of South Carolina provides that in
all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth of the alleged libel may be given
in evidence, and the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts. Held,
that an instruction by the judge that this provision did not go any farther
than to allow truth: as a mitigation was error.
The case of State v. Lehre, 2 Brev. 446, 4 Am. Dec. 596, decided that a
person indicted for libel could not give any evidence tending to prove the
truth of the libelous matter in justification without the consent of the prose-
cutor. Other cases have granted this right in prosecutions, for the publication
of papers investigating the official conduct of men in public capacity, or when
the matter published is proper for public information. The court holds that
the provision of the constitution of I895 goes further, permitting all persons
indicte4 for libel to show the truth of the libel. It also makes the jury the
judges of the law and the facts, and does not give the judge the right to de-
clare what shall -be the effect of the testimony.
DEATH OF PARENT-DAMAGES.-STAHLER ET AL V. PHILA. & R. Ry. Co., 49
Atl. 273 (Penn.).The defendant company negligently caused the death of
plaintiffs' father, who. was accustomed to make them a yearly allowance.
Held, that the plaintiffs' right to recover damages was not affected by the
fact that they inherited their father's estate.
The true measure of damages in similar cases generally has been laid down
as Ping the pecuniary loss to the survivors, entitled to compensation.
Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349; McIntyre v. N. Y. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; Balti-
more R. Co. v. Kelly, 24 Md. 271. The fact that an inheritance is gained does
not decrease the loss sustained by the withdrawal of a yearly allowance. A
close analogy is found in the United States rule that the amount recovered is
not reduced by the amount of insurance carried by the depeased. Railroad Co.
v. Kirk, go Penn. xS; Althorf v. Wolf, 22 N. Y. 355; She-hock v. Ailing, 44 Ind.
184.
EVIDENCE-ADmI5SIONS--ATTEMPT To BRIBI-AGENcY-NOWACK v. METRO-
POLITAN ST. Ry. Co., 6o N. E. 32 (N. Y..)-The "investigator" of a corpo-
ration, employ to see to the witnesses and to take their statements and to
interview witnesses, on the trial of actions against it, attempted to bribe wit-
nesses to testify in favor of the corporation. Held, that evidence of this was
admissible against the corporation, though there was no proof that it autho-
rized the act.
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That a corporation, as well as another master, is liable for the injury done
another by its agent, though unauthorized to do the particular dct, is quite well
established, Railway Co. v. McMahon, 1o3 Ill. 485, Railroad Co. v.
Rambo, 59 Fed. 75, 8 C. C. A. 6, though the contrary is held
in Green Y. Town of Woodbury, 48 Vt. 5. This case, however,
goes to an extreme and, on the broad ground of preserving purity in justice,
holds the master to answer and admits this evidence against him though no
injury was actually done to the other party by the agent's act.
EXCHANGES-PROPERTY RIGHT IN MAICET QUOTATIONS-WHAT CONSTI-
TUTES PUBLICATION.-BoARD OF TRADE OF CHICAGO v. HADDEN-KRULL Co. ET AL.,
Iog Fed. 705 (Wis.).-A board of trade, in furnishing market quotations,
made upon the transaction of its exchange, to customers for their exclusive
use, either by means of a ticker or by putting them on a blackboard, does not
publish them in such a way as to lose property right therein.
That there is a property right in such quotations has been well established.
Telegraph Co. v. Gregory, (I896) i Q. B. x47. But in the case of credit rat-
ing companies, who send books to their subscribers under contract that the
books remain the property of the distributor and if found in other hands than
subscribers will be confiscated, etc., etc., it has been held that inasmuch as the
number of subscribers is practically unlimited there is a publication of these vol-
umes. Todd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 705; Iellewers' Mercantile Co. v. Jellewers'
Weekly, 49 N. E. 872 (N. Y.). The case of Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U. S.
617, carries the doctrine of publication to a considerable extent. In that case
a reporter of decisions, in compliance with a statute of Illinois, deposited a
certain number of copies with the Secretary of State, for purposes pro-
vided for by law, and although he did not expose them for sale in the
usual way, this'was held to constitute a publication sufficient to deprive him
of his property right, the reasoping of the court being that, "whatever the
occasion for it, the public, or an indefinite portion of it, were assured oif
access to the books without further action on the part of the author."
FELLow SERVANTS-VICE PRINCIPAL-INsTRUCTION-NEw OMAHA THOMP-
SoN-HousToN ELECTRIC LIGHT Co. v. BALDwIN, 87 N. W. (Neb.) 27.-One
Brinkman, a foreman in the employ of the plaintiff in error, while assisting
the defendant in error, a lineman named Baldwin, also a servant of the Electric
Co., negligently injured the latter, while in the discharge of his duties.
From the evidence it appears that at the time of the accident Brinkman was
not acting towards the defendant in error in the capacity of a foreman.
The trial court charged the jury that since Brinkman was a foreman he
was a vice-principal and -that the company was liable, negligence being ad-
mitted. This was objected to, council contending that at the time Brinkman
was not acting as foreman, and that in any case, whether he was a fellow
servant or not was a question of mixed law and fact, and hence for the jury.
On appeal the court held, that the capacity in which Brinkman was acting
when the accident occurred was immaterial, since he was a vice-principal in
any case. Judgment affirmed.
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This case is interesting as showing to what an extreme length the Nebraska
courts have carried the "vice-principal doctrine," a doctrine which has either
been repudiated, or much modified in most of the states. Nebraska, however,
follows the Ohio doctrine as laid down in Bena Stone v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St.
287, which held substantially as above.
GIFT-s-CHOsE IN ACTIoN-DEcLARATION OF HUSBAND.-FIRST NATIONAL
BANK OF RICHMOND V. HOLLAND, 39 S. E. Rep. 126 (Virginia) .- A certificate
for shares of stock was delivered without indorsement to the defendant by
her husband as a gift. The husband's creditors demanded that the stock
should be applied to his debts. Held, a certificate of stock, a chose in action,
is not within the code declaring that no gift of "goods and chattels" shall be
valid unless by deed or will, or unless the donee have actual possession.
In many cases stock has been treated as other kinds of personal property
and trover sustained, Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242; Free-
man v. Harwood, 49 Maine 195. Contract for sale of shares is contract for
sale of goods within the statute of frauds. Tisdale.v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9. The
court in this case reviews the several sections of the Code in which the words
"goods and chattels" are found, and declares that these terms in every instance
are limited in meaning to corporal personal property.
Giving the words "goods and chattels" in the section in controversy the
same construction, the court holds that choses in action are not included.
A similar decision is found in Kirkland v. Brune, 31 Grat 126.
INSANE FELLOW SERVANT-PRESUMPTION.-ATKINSoN v. CLARK, 64 Pac. 769
(Calif.).-Plaintiff was injured while tearing down some walls at a state
asylum for the insane on which some of the inmates were working. There
was no negligence on the part of the asylum officials in selecting the inmates
who were put on such jobs. Held, there can be no presumption that the in-
mates were dangerous and unskillful from the fact alone that they were
insane.
Apparently there is no case in point. The decision would appear to be
a correct one, however. There are undoubtedly numerous forms of insanity
in which the afflicted persons fully retains the skill of his hands and an ordi-
nary realization of common dangers. Arguing from the standpoint of custom
and usage it may be said that in a great many of our large state insane asylums
in this country the labor of the inmates figures as an important factor in the
maintenance of the premises and the performance of various menial duties.
LIKENESSES-USE FOR ADVERTISING-RIGHT OD PRIVACY.-RoBERSON v.
ROCHESTER FOLDING BOX Co. ET AL., 71 N. Y. Supp. 876.-Defendants without
authority published and circulated lithographic prints of plaintiff with adver-
tisements of their business thereon. Plaintiff was hereby made the subject
of scoffs and jeers, causing her humiliation and sickness. Held, to be an in-
vasion of her right of privacy for which she might maintain action to restrain
publication and for damages.
This decision is another forward step on the part of the courts in estab-
lishing and protecting the right of privacy. The theory upon which the action
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is allowed is new, at least in instance and few precedents can be found to
sustain the plaintiff's claim. The leading case of Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y.
434, in refusing the relief sought did not deny the existence of this right, but
held that whatever right of privacy a person possessed died with him and could
not be enforced by relatives. Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 28o, dis-
tinguished between public and private characters, holding that a private indi-
vidual should be protected against the publication of any portrait of himself,
but that with an individual in public life it was different-a distinction followed
in this case. The court here grants the relief sought, upon the ground that
the plaintiff's personal comfort had been interfered with without her consent
and to her injury. Her feelings were wounded and the respect with which she
was held by the community was diminished by being thus brought into unnec-
essary and unwarantable notice. The principles of natural justice demand
that individuals be protected against such invasions of their privacy.-(See
editorial comment supra.)
MANDAmus-TELEPHONE COMPANIES-DIsCRIMINATION.-STATE EX REL.
GWYNNE V. CrIIZENs' TELEPHONE CO., 39 S. E. Rep. 257 (S. C.)-Defendant
refused to furnish the petitioner with telephone facilities because the peti-
tioner had not complied with a previous contract with the defendant, whereby
he agreed to use the defendant's telephone exclusively. Held, that mandamus
would lie to compel defendant to furnish petitioner with a telephone.
Cases like Aiken v. Telegraph Co., 5 S. C. 358 and Pickney v. Telegraph
Co., 19 S. C. 71, 45 Am. Rep. 765 seems to have conveyed the impression that
telegraph and telephone companies were in no sense common carriers. But
these actions were brought to recover damages for errors in the transmission
of messages. Telegraph companies are in no sense to be regarded as com-
mon carriers and are liable for improper transmission of messages only
upon proof of negligence, but they are like common carriers in that they are
bound to serve all those impartially all those applying to them. 6 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law, (2nd Ed.) 261. The court holds, quoting State v. Nebraska Telephone
Co., 17 Neb. 126, 52 Am. Rep. 4o4, that a telephone company cannot arbitrarily
refuse its facilities to any person who offers to comply with its reasonable
regulations, and argues that the refusal to agree to use defendant's telephone
system exclusively is not sufficient to relieve the defendant from its obligation
to serve the public, of which the petitioner was one, without any discrimina-
tion whatsoever. If there had been any breach of contract, of which the
defendant had any right to complain, its remedy was an action to recover
damages for such breach of contract.
MARITIME LIENS-MAS=T OF A DREDGE.-THE JOHN McDRMOTT, iog Fed.
9.-Held, the master of a dredge, not capable of being navigated, and not
earning any money which passes through his hands, and who is really gen-
eral superintendent of the work, having charge of the men on board, and
himself performing the duties of engineer, fireman, and general deck hand,
is entitled to a lien on the vessel, the same as any seaman.
The privilege of a maritime lien is not confined to that class of seamen
who possess a peculiar nautical skill but includes all those whose services
are in furtherance of the main object of the enterprise on which the ship is
YALE LA WJOURNAL.
engaged. Steam Dredge, No. s, (D. C.) 87 Fed. 76o; The -Atlantic, 53 Fed.
607. Regarding the question of a non-navigable dredge being subject to a
maritime lien, there is no satisfactory test as to what floating structures are,
and what are not, subject to admiralty jurisdiction, but Judge Hanford, in
McRae v. Bowers Dredging Co., 86 Fed. 344, where he declares that a steam
dredge is within the jurisdiction of an admiralty court, suggests a good rule
by his reasoning that "She has mobility, and her element is the water. She
can be used afloat and not otherwise. She has carrying capacity, and her
employment has direct reference to commerce and navigation."
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STREETS-TELEGRAPHS-POLES IN STREETS-
POWER TO PROHIBIT ERECTION-STATE EX REL. WISCONSIN TELEPHONE CO. V.
CITY OF SHEBOYGAN, 87 N. W. (Wis.) 657.-Appeal from a judgment in favor
of the defendant. This is an action of mandamus against the city of Sheboy-
gan and others.
The relator, the Wisconsin Telephone Co., sought to erect and maintain
poles and wires in Sheboygan, a city of about 50,000 inhabitants, and were
prevented from so doing on the ground that the relator refused to comply
with certain conditions, regarding rates of fare, free use of poles by the city,
etc., which conditions the city of Sheboygan claimed were proper police regu-
lations. Held, that city had no such power. Judgment was therefore re-
versed.
The present case is certainly very near the line. The tendency in most
states has been towards giving municipalities considerable scope in the exer-
cise of its police owners to regulate the overcrowding its streets with
unsightly poles and wires. And this jurisdiction has laid down a liberal doc-
trine in the city of Marshfield, case 78 N. W. 735, io2 Wis. 6o4., but appears
to wish to restrict corporate powers more closely in the present instance.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ALTERATION.-HOFFMAN V. PLANTERS' NATIONAL
BANK, 39 So. E. Rep. 134, (Virginia) .- H. signed a note, payable to herself,
and, without endorsing it, gave it to W. to take up a note held by a bank
signed by W. and indorsed by H. The bank struck off the name of H. as
payee, and inserting that of W. had W. indorse it. Held, that this was a
material alteration, avoiding the note as to H.
Whether signing the note as drawer and omitting to put her name on the
back thereof as indorser was accidental or not is immaterial. It was an in-
complete instrument, its defects not being such that authority to complete the
instrument was to be implied from the nature of the contract or from custom.
Changing the note by erasing the original and inserting a different payee is a
material- alteration. Robinson v. Berryman, 22 Mo. App. 512.
NUISANCE-PowDER MAGAzINE.-TucKASHNISKY v. LEHIGH & W. COAL
Co., 49 At. 3o8 (Penn.).-A powder magazine, containing explosives in
small quantities, originally located in a non-residence district, but around
which people had settled, was struck by lightning and exploded, injuring the
plaintiff, who lived nearby. No complaint had ever been made about this
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magazine. Held, as a matter of law, the powder magazine was not a nuisance,
and hence that the plaintiff could not recover, without proving negligence on
the part of the defendant.
The keeping of the explosives in certain places and under certain conditions
may be a nuisance per se...Cheatltam v. Shearon, I Swan. 213; Laflin-Rand
Powder Co. v. Tearney, 23 N. E. 389 (Ill.). The present case is extraordinary
in that the question of the existence of a nuisance was not left to the jury.
Heeg v. Licht, 8o N. Y. 579; Prussak v. Hutton, 3o N. Y. App. Div. 66.
PARTIES-JUDICIAL SALE-SETTING ASIDE DEED-CHILLING BIDDING--LIMI-
.TATION.-TooLE v. JOHNSON, 39 S. E. Rep. 254. (S. C..-At a sale under
execution, an attorney made the announcement that he hoped nobody would
bid against his client, who would bid the amount of the judgment, and buy
in the land for the children of the decedent. Held, that the statute began to
run against a person seeking to set aside the sale because of chilling the bid-
ding from the time of the discovery of the fraud.
Fraud without concealment is not sufficient. 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 729.
State v. Furlong, 6o Miss. 839. The court does not follow these cases, but
holds that the provision of the Code-"any action for relief on the ground
of fraud is not to be deemed to have occurred until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud"-is to be construed lit-
erally, and that there is nothing in the provision to limit its application to
secret frauds.
POLICE REGULATION-DoMEsTIc ANIMAL.-SIFERS V. JOHNSON, 65 Pac. 709
(Idaho).-A statute, prohibiting the herding or grazing of sheep within two
miles of an inhabited dwelling, is a valid exercise of the police power of
the State, and is not unconstitutional. Stockslager, J., dissenting.
The court adjudges the statute to be intended to prevent conflicts, resulting
from the clash of interest between sheep raising and farming, and also to
protect the health of the settlers. This decision seems to extend the police
power of a state to great lengths, and almost to sanction the taking of prop-
erty without due process of law. The judges in this case were governed in
rendering their decision by the opinions of Cooley and Tiedeman, regarding
the extent of a state's police power. Cooley's Con. Lin., 704-5; Tiedeman's
State & Fed. Control of Per. and Prop., 838.
REPLEVIN-CusTODY OF PROPERTY-SALE BY ONE IN POSSESSION-CoN-
VERSION.-MOHR V. SANGAN, 63 S. W. 4o9 (Mo.)-A plaintiff having ac-
quired possession by replevin, sold the property during the pendency of the
suit. Held, that such property was in custodia legis, and hence he was liable
for conversion.
There appears to be an irreconcilable conflict of authority upon this point.
Of the cases which hold that property taken under a writ of replevin remains
in custodia legis, even when the possession is delivered to the plaintiff in the
suit, he being regarded only as standing as a substitute for the sheriff,
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McKinney v. Purcell, 28 Kan. 446; Hunt v. Robinson, ixi Cal. 262, are ex-
amples. On the other hand, White v. Dolliver, 113 Mass. 4oo; Coen v. Wat-
khis, 62 Mo. App. 5o2, hold that property does not remain in custodia legis
after it has been delivered to the plaintiff in the replevin suit and that such
plaintiff may sell it and pass a good title, being liable to defendant, if the
latter is successful, only for the value of the property. While Donohue v.
McAleer, 37 Mo. 312, hold that such property may be sold, Bank v. Owen,
79 Mo. 429 proceeds on the theory that it is in custodia legis. By this decis-
ion, however, the position of the Missouri courts upon this question is clearly
defined.
STREET RAILROADS-RIGHT in HIGHWAY-DRIVER OF VEHICLE.-WOODLAND
V. NORTH JERSEY ST. RY. Co., 49 Alt. 479 (N. J.).-The plaintiff, in a well
lighted street, at night, when about to cross the highway in his carriage, saw
a trolley car approaching 250 feet away. He at once proceeded to cross,
with his horse on a walk, without further watching the approach of the car
which collided with his carriage, causing him personal injuries. Upon the
trial of his action the court refused to nonsuit on the ground of contributory
negligence. Held, on error, that the ruling was correct.
The point in this case is not whether the plaintiff was negligent but whether
his negligence so clearly appears that the case should have been taken from
the jury. The plaintiff was only- required to extend his observation to an
approaching car that, proceeding at customary and reasonably safe seed,, would
threaten his safety, Railway Co. v. Block, 322 L. R. A. 374.
A driver may obtain a right of way over a street railroad, where, in the
reasonable exercise of his rights, he reaches the point of crossing in time to
safely go upon the tracks in advance of the approaching car, the latter being
sufficiently distant to be checked, and if need be, stopped, before is should
reach him. Railroad Co. v. Miller, 36 Atl. 885.
TELEPHONE COMPANIEs-PoLEs-FIxTuREs-LIcENsE-REvocATIoN.-RED-
FIELD TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH Co. v. CYR. ET AL., 49 At. 1O47 (Me.).-
The poles and fixtures of a telephone company, which has erected its poles
along a highway by the permission of the municipal officers, do not become a
part of the realty, but remain chattels, subject to seizure and sale on execu-
tion.
It was held in Paris v. Water Co., 85 Me. 330, that water pipes, hydrants,
etc., were real estate of the purpose of taxation. It has also been held that
gas and water pipes are mains, and the poles and wires of an electric light
plant were appurtenances to the realty, on which were built the operating
plants. Capital Gas Light Co. v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 51 Iowa, 31; Fechet v.
Drake, (Ariz.), 12 Pac. 694; Badger Lumber Co. v. Marion Electric Co., 29
Pac. 476; Appeal of Des Moines Water Co., 48 Iowa, 324. In Newport Ill.
Co. v. Tax Assessors, the contrary view is taken as to the poles and wires
of an electric light plant. The present case decides that telephone poles and
wires are not appurtenant to the realty, but mere chattels.
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TRADEmAIK-INJUNCTiON.-OMEGA OIL Co. v. WESCHLER ET AL., 71 N. Y.
Supp. 983.-Plaintiff under the trademark of "Omega Oil" manufactured a
green liniment, green being the distinctive color of the labels and advertise-
ments also. The defendants placed upon the market a green medicated soap,
put up in green wrapping, under the name of "Omega Oil Medicated Soap,"
using in the manufacture a small quantity of "Omega Oil." Held, that the
defendants be restrained from using the words "Omega Oil."
The decision is based on the assumption that the liniment and the soap,
being used for essentially the same purposes and therefore coming into direct
competition with each other in sale, belong to the same class of goods.
Carroll v. Ertheiler; i Fed. 688. The choice of the words "Omega Oil," and
of the color was calculated to deceive the public into the belief that plaintiff's
article was put up for sale in another form, or that the soap was manufactured
by plaintiff or by his consent-a species of competition which courts of equity
hold to be unfair. Fairbank Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 Fed. 869. Nor does the
use of a part of the product in the manufacture, allow the use of the name.
Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 Fed. 276. But the mere use of the color,
green, in articles and wrappings apart from the name, cannot be enjoined.
Fischer v. Blank, 138 N. Y. 244.
